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Central Bank Independence and 
Financing Government Spending* 
This paper incorporates the effect of the central bank's independence into the government's 
optimum financing model. When the implications of the hypotheses are tested for eighteen 
OECD countries, this paper shows that countries with higher levels of central bank indepen- 
dence generate l ss seigniorage revenue. 
1. Introduction 
This paper extends Mankiw's (1987) government optimum expendi- 
ture financing model to suggest that the choice between taxation and seign- 
iorage to finance government spending isinfluenced by the degree of central 
bank independence (CBI, hereafter). Earlier work on the relation between 
inflation (or seigniorage) and central bank independence (e.g., Alesina 1988, 
1989; Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; and Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti 1992) investigated the behavior of inflation within the inflation- 
unemployment or inflation-growth rate models. This paper tests the effects 
of the central bank's independence onthe tax-seigniorage trade-off. Empir- 
ical evidence from eighteen OECD countries for the sample 1972-1989 
suggests that seigniorage r venue creation is lower for those countries that 
have more independent central banks (CBs, hereafter). 
Governments may set up their monetary policies along with their tax 
policies to generate revenue. Since both of these resources create ineffi- 
ciencies in an economy, Manldw (1987) hypothesized that governments may 
raise both their tax and seigniorage r venues together to finance spending. 
He tested this hypothesis and found a positive relationship between tax and 
seigniorage revenues for the U.S. Even though Poterba and Rotemberg 
(1990) found similar supporting evidence for the U.S. and Japan, these au- 
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thors could not find parallel supporting evidence for France, Germany, and 
the U.K. Poterba nd Rotemberg pointed out that institutional factors may 
affect he tax-seigniorage trade-off. This paper considers different degrees 
of central bank independence as one institutional factor influencing the im- 
plications of the optimum financing model, and explores how the CBI affects 
the trade-off. 
When setting up their monetary policies, governments may face ad- 
ditional concerns, such as the need to achieve higher growth levels or to 
influence interest rates. First, governments respond to business cycles. Gov- 
ernments may have an incentive to adopt inflationary policies to decrease 
the level of unemployment (Barro and Gordon 1983). A second possible 
issue is suggested by a government's interest rate smoothing or deficit fi- 
nancing behavior: the stability of financial systems, with which the central 
bank must also concern itself (Cukierman 1990). When interest rates are too 
high or when deficit pressures on interest rates are likely to increase, the 
CB compromises it price stability objective and increases the money supply 
in the market to decrease any threat o the stability of financial systems. This 
paper therefore also considers these other governmental concerns (growth 
and interest rates); these factors do not, however, change the basic conclu- 
sion of the paper. 
The literature on the optimum financing model assumes that inflation 
is a proxy for government's seigniorage r venue (e.g., Mankiw 1987; Grilli 
1989; Poterba nd Rotemberg 1990; and Trehan and Walsh 1990). However, 
the inflation rate is affected by various factors in addition to seigniorage 
revenue. The next section of this paper, therefore, derives the implications 
of the optimum financing model when the government's policy variables are 
the tax and the monetary base growth rates, rather than the tax and inflation 
rates. 1Furthermore, the effects of the CBI are incorporated into Mankiw's 
optimum financing model in this section. Section 3 introduces the data, 
Section 4 presents empirical evidence, and the last section contains con- 
cluding comments. 
2. The Theoretical Model 
It is assumed that governments have two branches: monetary (the cen- 
tral bank) and fiscal. Governments ultimately finance their politically desired 
path of public spending by generating either tax or seigniorage revenues. 
Both branches of governments seek to minimize the present value of the 
burden of taxation and seigniorage revenues. However, CBs are more con- 
1The implication of the optimum financing model as derived when the government's policy 
vanables are the inflation and tax rates is also discussed briefly at the next section as a footnote. 
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cerned with seigniorage revenue creation than are the fiscal authorities. ~ 
Therefore, the more independent the CB, the more difficult creating agiven 
amount of money will be. The objective function for a given government is 
the following: 
oo 
Wt = ~ (1 + r)'-sr"l+~Lth+s - K(cbi)(Mt+~_l/Mt+8) 1-~] , (1) 
s=0 
where W t is the present value of the lost generated by taxation and seign- 
iorage revenue, 0t is the average tax rate and Mt is the monetary base (money, 
hereafter) at time t, r is the fixed real interest rate, cbi is the CBI index, and 
K(cbi) is the relative weight he government assigns to seigniorage r venue 
creation at any given level of taxation. The loss created by taxation is mea- 
sured as a function of the tax rate, 0t 1 +~, and seigniorage is measured as the 
negative of the reciprocal of the money growth rate, - (M t_ 1~Mr)1-13, at time 
t, where a and 13 are non-negative constants. Hence, W t is a convex function 
of both the tax rate and money growth. This satisfies the second-order con- 
ditions for the optimization problem. It is also assumed that K(cbi) is an 
increasing function of cbi; 3 a government will find it more difficult o increase 
money growth for countries which are associated with more independent 
CBs, ceteris paribus. 
The government intertemporal budget constraint requires that the 
government debt be equal to the debt and its interest payments from the 
previous period plus government spending minus government tax and seign- 
iorage revenues. The seigniorage r venue can be written as 
(Mr - Mt-t)/Pt = (1 - Mt_l /Mt)mt,  (2) 
where m t is real money holdings and Pt is the price level at time t. Therefore, 
the government intertemporal budget constraint can be written as 
bt = (1 + r)bt-1 + Gt - Otyt - (1 - (Mt-1/Mt))mt, (3) 
where bt is government debt, Gt is real government spending, and Yt is real 
income at time t. Governments minimize their objective function, Equation 
(1), subject o their intertemporal budget constraint, Equation (3), where 
2Both the CB and the treasury are subject to different political incentives and institutional 
constraints and may therefore differ on how to value the loss generated from tax and seigniorage 
revenues ,  
SA similar approach is also used by Tabellini (1986) to incorporate CBI into governments" 
objective functions. 
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the governments' policy variables are the tax rate, Ot and the inverse of the 
monetary base growth, M t_ 1~Mr. The Hamiltonian equation can be written 
as 
H = ,-st, ,1 + ~ _ vci(cbi)(Mt +s_ /Mt  +s) l -  ~] 
s=0 
- -  )~(rbt_ 1 + G t - Oty t - (1 - (Mt_ l /Mt ) )mt) .  (4) 
The first-order conditions require that the marginal loss of taxation must be 
equal to the marginal loss of money growth. The marginal loss of taxation is 
((1 + a)O")/(1 + ao)Yt, (5) 
where ~0 is the constant elasticity of real income with respect o the tax rate. 
Inclusion of e0 was suggested by Poterba nd Rotemberg to incorporate the 
feedback effects from taxation to real income. The marginal oss of money 
growth for the government is equal to 
((1 - ~ )c(cbi ) (Mt_ ~Mr) -  ~)/(mt(1 - ~)  ) . (6) 
Because money growth, which causes inflation, affects the opportunity cost 
of holding money, to address this the above equation incorporates the con- 
stant elasticity of real money holdings with respect o the change in money 
growth, %. Note also that higher cbi causes the marginal loss of the money 
growth rate to increase for government because generating the same amount 
of seigniorage will be more costly if CB is more independent. The reason 
could be that unlike the central authority, CB is not a political institution 
that may benefit from generating unexpected inflation. The central govern- 
ment may have an incentive to increase money supply to increase its pop- 
ularity. Hence, central banks may be more concerned than the central au- 
thority with the loss generated by inflation. It is assumed that K(cbi) = e ~Cb~, 
where 6 is a positive constant; the first-order conditions will give the follow- 
ing after equating the logarithms of Equations (5) and (6): 
ln(M~/Mt_I)  = 1/13 ln((1 + c~)(1 - ~) ) / ( (1  - 13)(1 + ~o)) 
+ (a/B) lnOt + (1/13) In (m/yt )  - (5 /~)cbi .  (7) 
If government preferences towards tax and seigniorage creation are 
constant, and the cost of tax collecting is time invafiant, then Equation (7) 
should hold without an error term. However, this paper investigates whether 
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a substantial part of the seigniorage revenue creation can be explained by 
the optimum financing model under different levels of CBI, rather than by 
an exact relationship between tax and seigniorage revenue creation. Hence, 
in order to explain the behavior of seigniorage revenue under these factors, 
an error term is included. The following equation will be estimated. 
ln(M/Mt_I) = 70 + 71 In 0t + 7.2 In (m/y  t) + 73cbi + at .  (8) 
Here, 70 = (1/[3)ln((1 + c~)(1 - a.))/((1 - [3)(1 + eo)), 71 = ~/[3, 72 
= 1/[3 and 73 = -5/[3. The testable implications of the model are that 71 
and 72 are positive, and 73 is negative. The theory suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between tax and seigniorage revenues. The more in- 
dependent the CB, the less seigniorage revenue will be created. Note that 
both 0t and (Mt/M~_ 1) are in logarithmic terms. Hence (Me/Mt_l)/Ot de- 
creases with higher independence of CBs. In that sense, not the level of but 
the proportion of seigniorage revenue decreases with higher levels of CBI. 4 
3. Data 
The optimum financing model implicitly assumes that governments 
can increase taxes along with seigniorage to raise revenue when they need 
additional resources. However, developing countries may have difficulties in 
raising their tax revenues because of their less developed infrastructure for 
collecting taxes. Therefore, this paper's data set includes observations from 
4The literature uses inflation as a proxy for seigniorage. Hence, we also consider amodel 
where inflation is the government's monetary policy tool. The optimization problem can be 
written as 
Wt = ~ (1 + r)-'[0x+~ a - ¢:'(cbi)((Pt+,_l/P~+~))l-~]. 
s=0 
Where ~(dbi), d and ~ have similar interpretation discussed above. In order to find a relation 
between i flation and tax rate, the intertemporal budget constraint eeds to be modified as 
b, = (1 + r)bt-i + Gt - Otyt - (mt - (Pt-JPt)mt-1), 
where the seigniorage r venue can be written as (M t - M t_ 1)/Pt = mt - (P~-1/Pt)mt-1. When 
the government's policy variables are the tax rate and inflation, then the testable implication of
the hypothesis becomes 
ln(egPt_l) = % + 41 ln0t + 4z In(mt-1/yt) + 43cbi + ¢t. 
Here 41 and 41 are positive and 43 is negative. 
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eighteen industrialized OECD countries. The annual observations from 
1972 to 1989 for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Ger- 
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Swe- 
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are used to 
test the basic hypothesis of this paper. The consumer price index (CPI, 
hereafter), monetary base, GNP, 5 and government spending ~ are from the 
International Monetary Fund--International Financial Statistics. Central 
government receipts 7 are from OECD National Accounts, Income and Out- 
lay Transactions of General Government. Money growth is the first differ- 
ence of the logarithm of the monetary base. The inflation rate is the first 
difference of the logarithm of CPI. The logarithm of the tax rate is the 
logarithm of the central government's receipt-GNP ratio. 
This paper employs monetary base growth as a proxy for the seignior- 
age revenue. Although Klein and Newman (1990) suggest a direct way of 
measuring the seigniorage revenue, they note that measuring the creation 
of seigniorage revenue by using the method they recommend depends on 
the legal, institutional nd operational details of the monetary base creation 
that cannot be compared across countries. This study, however, requires a 
proxy of seigniorage r venue that can be compared across countries. There- 
fore, the monetary base growth is used as a measure of seigniorage rather 
than calculating a new variable. 
In addition, this paper measures a central bank's independence as the 
legal independence of the central bank from its own government since the 
CB's actual independence is very difficult o measure. Various studies look 
at the legal independence of CBs. This paper employs the legal indepen- 
dence of CB from the Bade and Parkin (1987) (BP, hereafter), modified 
version of Bade and Parldn (MBP, hereafter) by Burdekin and Willett 
(1991), and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) indexes (GMT, here- 
after), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) (CWN, hereafter), s Some of 
the indexes are not available for all eighteen OECD countries considered. 
Therefore, it was necessary to exclude Austria, Greece, Finland, Ireland, 
5The GNP is not available for France, so GDP is used instead. 
e'Fhe government spending figures for Japan are not available from the International Mon- 
etary Fund~International Financial Statistics for the sample period. This series i  taken from 
OECD National Accounts, Income and Outlay Transactions of General Government. Govern- 
ment spending for the U.S. is from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Re- 
search. This series i  also not available for the sample period from the International Monetary 
Fund---International Financial Statistics. 
7Government receipts for the U.S. are not available for the sample period from the Inter- 
national Monetary Funds--International Financial Statistics; therefore, the series i  from the 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Research. 
SThese rankings are calculated for several countries by considering different sample periods. 
The rankings are a constant umber for the entire period for each country. 
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Italy, and Spain when the BP index is used; Austria, Greece, Finland, Ire- 
land, Italy, Norway, and Spain when the MBP index is used; and finally, 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden when the GMT indexes 
are used. 
Bade and Parkin consider the period 1973-1985 for their CBI index. 
They look at who appoints the central banker and how often; the presence 
of government officers in the board of the bank; and whether there are any 
requirements for government approval of specific policies. Burdekin and 
Willett (1991) note, however, that the BP index assigns the same level of 
independence to the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve. Burdekin and 
Willett (1991) therefore created the modified CBI index where the Bank of 
Japan has a higher level of dependence. 
Grilfi, Masciandaro, and Tabelfini created two types of CBI indexes, 
one political and one economic, each of which covers the period 1950-1989. 
The former index considers political independence as the capacity to choose 
the final goal of monetary policy: e.g., inflation or economic activity (GMT.P, 
hereafter). The latter index (GMT.E, hereafter) assumes that the economic 
independence of the CB lies in the bank's ability to choose the instruments 
with which to pursue its goals. 
The CWN index combines those two types of indexes together and 
considers the period between 1980 and 1989. Sixteen characteristics of cen- 
tral banks are considered within four groups. The first group of character- 
istics includes the variables related to the appointment, dismissal, and terms 
of the office of the CB governor. The second group of characteristics overs 
variables related to resolving conflicts between the CB and the executive 
branch. The third group covers the final objectives of CBs as stated in their 
charters, while the fouth examines legal restrictions on the ability of the 
public sector to borrow from the CB. The compilers then took the mean of 
these sixteen variables to calculate the CBI index. 
Even if these indexes include various pecific factors, it is useful to see 
how these indexes are correlated. Table 1 presents the correlations among 
these different CB independence indexes. Overall, CWN provides the most 
general measure of CBI by including both political and economic variables. 
BP, MBP and GMT.P use political variables, while GMT.E uses economic 
variables, to construct the rankings. Standard errors are reported beneath 
each correlation. 9 There are positive correlations among the indexes. The 
strongest correlation is between BP and MBP. The reason could be that 
MBP is a modified version of the BP. Not surprisingly, given that these 
indices use different measures to construct the rankings, the weakest cor- 
relation is between GMT.P and GMT.E. 
9An in-depth discussion of these indexes is available from the author upon request. 
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TABLE 1. Correlation among Various Central Banks" Independence 
Indexes~ 
CWN BP MBP GMT.P GMT.E 
CWN 1.000 0.67821 0.86800 0.79581 0.48670 
0.0 0.0153 0.0003 0.0020 0.1086 
BP 1.000 0.87797 0.44281 0.46751 
0.0 0.0004 0.2000 0.1731 
MBP 1.0 0.60971 0.64733 
0.0 0.0464 0.0313 
GMT.P 1.000 0.34081 
0.0 0.2783 
GMT.E 1.000 
0.0 
f Standard errors are reported under the correlations. 
4. The Empirical Evidence 
The first aim of this section is to test whether seigniorage revenue 
creation can be explained by the optimum financing model under different 
levels of CBI by using a pooled time series-cross section procedure. Also, 
the literature assumes that inflation is a proxy for seigniorage. Hence, the 
second aim of this section is to consider another model where the inflation 
is a proxy for seigniorage revenue. 1° 
The CBI index is prepared as a constant number for each country 
across the given time period. Hence, single country regression coefficients 
could not be estimated when the CBI index is used as an additional variable 
because of perfect multicollinarity. Furthermore, performing the least 
square method oes not incorporate any contemporaneous relations among 
residual and group-wise heterogeneity to improve fficiency. Hence, we es- 
timate the testable quations by using the Parks (1967) procedure. The pro- 
cedure performs the generalized least squares method (GLS) across coun- 
tries and estimates the model by considering, first, any autocorrelation for 
1°Various other definitions of seigniorage r venue, as described in Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini (1992), are also used as a proxy for seigniorage and with their analog for tax revenue. 
The proxies for seigniorage considered were change in base-GNP ratio and change in base- 
government spending ratio, inflation times base-GNP ratio, inflation times base-government 
spending ratio, change in monetary base-price ratio. Even though these proxies for seigniorage 
gave parallel results with monetary base growth and inflation, the strongest positive association 
for the tax and seigniorage r venues was obtained when the seigaiorage r venue is proxied by 
monetary base growth and inflation. Hence, we report only these. 
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TABLE 2. 
1972-1989t 
Central Bank Independence 
The Empirical Evidence on the Optimum Financing Model: 
In mt In mr-1 
Dep. Var. Constant Time ln0t Yt Yt SSR 
In Mt 0.4352 -0.002 0.0506 0.0875 265.47 
Mt-i 16.271 -5.214 6.2396 11.058 
In Pt 0.2438 -0.001 0.0351 0.0299 268.22 
Pt-i 15.887 -3.542 8.5499 9.5928 
NOTE: ln0t = logarithm ofthe tax rate; ln[mjyt] = logarithm ofthe real monetary base- 
real GNP ratio; ln[mt_l/yt] = logarithm ofthe lag value of the real monetary base-real GNP 
ratio; cbi = central bank independence index; SSR is the sum of squared residuals. SSRs are 
calculated after the Parks estimation, which performs the generalized least squares stimation; 
consequently, SSRs are close to the number of observations i  the sample. 
~t-ratios are reported under the corresponding estimated coefficients. 
each country, second, for any group wise heterogeneity across countries, and 
third, for any cross-country correlation. The method also constrains the es- 
timated coefficients for each country such that each variable has the same 
estimated coefficient across countries. 
Before presenting the evidence for our baseline models, single country 
regressions, after considering for the first degree autoeorrelation, is exam- 
ined. We regress both money growth and inflation rates on constant term, 
time trend, tax rate and money-income ratio. This study does not find posi- 
tive and statistically significant coefficients for the tax rates for most of the 
eighteen countries. This evidence is consistent with Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991)'s ingle equation estimation results (to save space, the single 
country regression results are not reported here). Next, we estimate the 
same model by pooling data for eighteen countries. Positive and statistically 
significant coefficients of the tax rates are found that support he implication 
of the optimum financing model. The reason why we found stronger sup- 
porting evidence for the model could be that we used a more efficient es- 
timation method, GLS, than the ordinary least squares method (Table 2). 
Furthermore, when the data set is pooled, the variability of the tax rate 
increases and this improves the efficiency of the estimates compared to sin- 
gle country regression results. 
This section also considers empirical evidence for two models. The 
frst model is a relationship among monetary base growth, tax rate and CBI, 
as suggested by Equation (8). Panel A of Table 3 reports the results for the 
model in which the monetary base is the dependent variable. Each column 
reports the estimates of the model when different CBI indexes are used. 
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Both the money growth rate and tax rates appear to have time trends. Per- 
forming a single regression analysis for Equation (8) may capture the time 
trend that both the logarithm of the tax rate and the money growth rate 
share. Hence, before estimating the model, the time trend is included in 
the regression analysis, n As the optimum financing model suggests, the es- 
timated coefficients of the tax rate are always positive for all the estimates 
performed for each CBI index. Three of these five coefficients are statisti- 
cally significant at least at the 10% level of confidence. The estimated co- 
efficients for the CBI indexes are always negative, as the model suggests, 
and significant for four out of the five cases. 12 Hence, these results uggest 
that there is a positive relation between tax and seigniorage r venues and 
an inverse relation between creation of seigniorage r venue and the inde- 
pendence of the CB. 
It is plausible that the positive relationship between the money growth 
rate and the tax rate reported in Panel A of Table 3 is proxying arelationship 
other than that suggested by the optimum financing model. Hence, in this 
study we also performed regression analyses in which other possible gov- 
ernment concerns are considered. The first additional concern is the possi- 
bility governments respond to business cycles; therefore, to control this fac- 
tor, a proxy for business cycles, the growth rate of real GNP, is included in 
the regression analysis on an ad hoc basis, is The second possible concern is 
whether CB's responded to changes in the interest rates which are due to 
government deficits. Governments do not have complete control over the 
interest rate; rather, the interest rate could be influenced by a changing 
government deficit. Increasing overnment spending will increase the inter- 
est rate, and the CB may increase the money supply to offset his increase. 
To eontrol for the second factor, a measure of government spending isalso 
included. Therefore, both the growth of the real GNP Yt, and the logarithm 
of the government spending-GNP ratio, lngt, are included in the regression 
analysis. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results after including those two addi- 
tional variables into the model. The results do not reject he implications of 
either the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between tax and 
nBoth Mankiw and P&R included the time trend in their models before testing. 
12The level of significance is 5% unless otherwise noted. 
13Unemployment ra es could be used as a proxy for business cycles. We, however, could not 
use it as a proxy for two reasons. First, when pooling the unemployment data several missing 
observations appeared for some countries. Hence, we could not create a pooled data set for 
eighteen OECD countries in our study using the standardized unemployment ra es from OECD 
sources. Second, figures from a long data set available on IMF-IFS tapes could not be used as 
proxies for business cycles because ach of the eighteen countries used different unemployment 
calculation methods. 
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seigniorage revenues or the hypothesis that higher levels of CBI is associated 
with lower levels of seigniorage revenue creation. However, the estimated 
coefficient of the tax rate is negative when the BP and MBP indexes are 
used. The coefficients are not significant for either ease. 
Even if the results on the government spending coefficient are mixed, 
growth is associated with higher seigniorage revenue. The estimated coef- 
ficient for the lng t is positive when the CWN, BP and MBP indexes are used 
as a measure of CBI. However, this coefficient associated with the MBP 
index is insignificant; furthermore, the coefficient is negative and insignifi- 
cant for the GMT indexes. The findings in the literature are mixed as well; 
Evans (1988 and 1989) shows that for the U.S., the level of government 
spending or the deficit does not affect private consumption, investment, 
nominal interest rates or inflation. The estimated coefficients for the real 
GNP growth are positive and statistically significant for all the CBI indexes 
we consider. These results may suggest that a government's monetary poli- 
cies respond to the state of the economy. 14 
The second model is a relationship among inflation, the tax rate and 
CBI; this model is derived when the seigniorage revenue is proxied by the 
inflation rate. Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for this analysis. The 
estimated coefficients of the tax rate are always positive and significant for 
all the CBI indexes considered. The coefficients of the CBI are negative and 
significant at least at the 10% level for four out of the five indexes considered. 
When a government's other possible concerns are included, the results are 
reported in Panel B. The estimated coefficients for the tax rate are found 
positive and significant. The CBI index has negative and significant coeffi- 
cients for the CWN, BP and MBP indexes. The coefficients for the GMT 
indexes remained negative but statistically insignificant. The estimated co- 
efficients for the government spending-GNP ratio and the growth rate are 
both negative and statistically significant. Economic reasoning behind this 
finding is that the government may adopt stabilizing policies to decrease 
inflation when it is high by reducing overnment spending. Therefore, this 
suppresses the economic growth. 
Estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 might suffer from the simulta- 
neous equation bias problem. The first reason is that the theory presented 
in Section 2 assumes that governments determine tax and seigniorage r v- 
enues imultaneously. Second, the first-order conditions not only imply that 
the marginal deadweight loss of taxation is equal to the marginal deadweight 
loss of the money growth, but also imply that the marginal deadweight loss 
of taxation (or money growth) must be the same across time; hence, both 
14The analyses are repeated for the growth rate of the real GDP. The simdar esults are 
found. 
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Hakan Berument 
the tax rate and the money growth rate are random walks. Hence, both the 
tax rate and the money growth rate are endogenous variables. Therefore, 
instrumental variables (IV, hereafter) are used to re-estimate he models. 
The instruments are a constant, a time trend, the CBI index, the first two 
lag values of each of the logarithm of tax rate, the logarithm of the govern- 
ment spending-GNP ratio, real GNP growth, monetary base growth (or in- 
flation) and the logarithm of the money-income ratio. To perform the IV 
technique, the ordinary least squares method is used for both the first and 
second stage regressions. 
The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 for the money growth-tax 
rate and inflation-tax rate relationships, respectively. Both tables indicate that 
none of the implications of the basic hypothesis of the paper is rejected. 
Panel A of Table 5 suggests that the estimated coefficients of the tax rate is 
negative for three out of the five indexes used for CBI. However, none of 
the coefficients for the tax rate are statistically significant. Similarly, the co- 
efficient of the CBI indexes are always negative, but statistically insignificant 
except for the case where the GMT.E index is used. When real GNP growth 
and the logarithm of government spending-GNP ratio are included, the es- 
timated coefficients for the tax rate are always positive but statistically insig- 
nificant. The only negative and statistically significant coefficient is found for 
the GMT.E index. Table 6 gives the IV estimates for the inflation-tax rate 
relationship. Estimated coefficients for the tax rates are always positive ex- 
cept when the BP index is used. The estimated coefficients for the CBI are 
always negative. Most of the estimates are statistically significant. The esti- 
mated coefficients for the government's other possible concern variables; 
the real growth rate is positive for the money growth rate equation, egative 
for the inflation equation, and they are statistically significant for both cases. 
The estimated coefficients for the government spending are negative for 
both relationships but are statistically significant only for the inflation equa- 
tion. Therefore, the sign of the coefficients obtained by the IV method are 
similar with the Parks method. However, the number of significant coeffi- 
cients obtained from the IV method isless than that from the Parks method. 
Some might argue that he simultaneity bias problem is the reason that 
stronger supporting evidence is provided for the basic hypotheses of the 
paper when the Parks procedure isused than when the IV method is used. 
However, the reason might alternatively be that the Parks method gives 
more efficient estimates than the IV method. 
The inflation-tax rate relationship yields more economically interpret- 
able results than the money growth rate-tax rate relationship. The reason 
for this could be that the former captures the internal dynamics of the gov- 
ernment better. If a government desires to increase its revenues, it can 
increase its money growth in a very short period of time; however, increasing 
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Central Bank Independence 
taxes may take some time because of the legislative and administrative d lays. 
Hence, both taxes and money growth may not be increased at the same 
period. However, increasing monetary base accelerates inflation in the next 
period, and this suggests that inflation and taxes might move together. 
Another eason could be that increasing seigniorage revenue may not 
be costly if there is economic growth. However, the cost appears as inflation 
if money creation exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Hence, the cost 
of seigniorage can be measured better with the inflation rate. 
In sum, when the Parks procedure is used, the evidence mostly sup- 
ports the hypotheses that there is a trade-off between tax and seigniorage 
revenue, and this revenue decreases with higher levels of CBI. The data 
provides the best supporting evidence for these two hypotheses, when, first, 
the inflation rate is the dependent variable and, second, the economic in- 
dependence of the CB is used as a measure of CBI. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper incorporates the effects of central bank independence in 
the tax-seigniorage r venue trade-off which governments face to finance 
their spending. The following two hypotheses are tested: first, governments 
use both their seigniorage r venues along with their tax revenues to finance 
their spending; and second, governments that are associated with more in- 
dependent central banks create less seigniorage r venue. Overall, these hy- 
potheses are supported for the various central bank independence indexes 
used when the seigniorage revenue isproxied by both inflation and the mon- 
etary base growth rate for eighteen OECD countries from 1972 to 1989. 
However, when the IV technique is used, the regressions provide weaker 
supporting evidence when government seigniorage r venue is proxied by 
monetary base growth. 
These results are consistent with the relevant literature on CBI (e.g., 
Cukierman 1992 and Alesina and Summers 1993), which suggests that more 
CBI leads to less inflation. Furthermore, the paper successfully demon- 
strates that the CBI does influence seigniorage creation. 
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